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Abstract
In this paper, we reconsider the question how monetary policy influences exchange rate dynam-
ics. To this end, a vector autoregressive (VAR) model is combined with a two-country dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. Instead of focusing exclusively on how monetary
policy shocks affect the level of exchange rates, we also analyze how they impact exchange rate
volatility. Since exchange rate volatility is not observed, we estimate it alongside the remaining
quantities in the model. Our findings can be summarized as follows. Contractionary monetary
policy shocks lead to an appreciation of the home currency, with exchange rate responses in the
short-run typically undershooting their long-run level of appreciation. They also lead to an in-
crease in exchange rate volatility. Historical and forecast error variance decompositions indicate
that monetary policy shocks explain an appreciable amount of exchange rate movements and
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1 Introduction
This paper reconsiders the effects of monetary policy on exchange rate dynamics. Instead of fo-
cusing exclusively on the reactions of the exchange rate, we propose a flexible empirical model
that allows also for analyzing how exchange rate volatility changes in response to monetary policy
shocks. Our empirical model, a Bayesian vector autoregressive model with stochastic volatility
(BVAR-SV) is combined with a two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model
that is used to construct a prior distribution as well as to carry out structural inference. We estimate
our model on three country pairs: US and Euro Area, US and UK, and US and Japan. We find that
US monetary contractions appreciate the dollar, on impact and in the long-run, with the degree
of short-run appreciation typically undershooting its long-run counterpart. A monetary tightening
also typically leads to increases in exchange rate volatility. Considering historical decompositions,
our analysis indicates that monetary policy disturbances have contributed considerably to explain-
ing fluctuations in the level and volatility of exchange rates, especially during the first half of the
sample.
Numerous contributions estimate the effects of monetary policy on exchange rates (see, inter
alia, Eichenbaum and Evans, 1995; Grilli and Roubini, 1995; Kim and Roubini, 2000a; Kim, 2001;
Kim and Roubini, 2000b; Faust and Rogers, 2003a; Bjornland, 2009; Kim, 2005; Scholl and Uhlig,
2008; Bouakez and Normadin, 2010; Kim et al., 2017; Mu¨ller et al., 2019; Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe,
2018). These studies, using VAR models, often find dynamic exchange rate responses that are in-
consistent with the exchange rate overshooting hypothesis put forth in Dornbusch (1976). Some
studies (see, among others, Eichenbaum and Evans, 1995; Kim, 2001; Kim and Roubini, 2000b) find
delayed overshooting, implying that immediate exchange rate reactions are weaker but grow in im-
portance over the impulse response horizon in a hump-shaped fashion. These contributions differ
in terms of model specification and identification. Most studies use two-country datasets and intro-
duce hard restrictions to alleviate issues related to overfitting. More precisely, instead of estimating
separate equations for home and foreign quantities, a common approach is to consider differences
between them and thus model relative movements. Using such restrictions in combination with
small models can translate into omitted variable biases that do not capture the information set used
by the central bank and might be one reason for observing puzzling exchange rate responses.
The second dimension where studies often differ relates to the identitification strategy used to
recover the structural impulse responses. Early contributions (Eichenbaum and Evans, 1995; Grilli
and Roubini, 1995) introduce timing restrictions that imply that, with respect to domestic monetary
policy shocks, foreign economies react with a lag. One issue with such identifying assumptions,
however, is that the researcher needs to decide on how the exchange rate reacts to monetary policy.
The standard option would be to assume that the exchange rate is allowed to react immediately to
interest rate changes. However, this assumption implies that the central bank is not allowed to react
to contemporaneous exchange rate movements. More recently, several studies (Faust and Rogers,
2003a; Scholl and Uhlig, 2008; Bouakez and Normadin, 2010; Kim et al., 2017) use sign restrictions
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to identify monetary policy shocks and trace the resulting exchange rate reactions. While sign
restrictions allow for contemporaneous relations between the reaction function of the central bank
and the exchange rate, they only allow for set identification and, if coupled with loose identifying
restrictions, often lead to inflated confidence bounds surrounding the impulse responses.
In this paper, we depart from the literature in three respects. First, we propose a medium-
scale BVAR model with SV. In contrast to the existing literature, we assume that prior information
arises from a two-country New Keynesian open economy DSGE model that closely follows Lubik
and Schorfheide (2005). To assess whether the DSGE model is consistent with the reduced-form
information contained in the VAR, we use novel shrinkage priors that endogenously determine how
much weight should be placed on the DSGE model.
Second, following Del Negro and Schorfheide (2004), we opt for identifying the model using
the implied covariance matrix of the structural shocks in the DSGE model. This implies that our
identification scheme rules out shortcomings associated with zero and sign restrictions. More im-
portantly, the corresponding deterministic rotation matrix is fully consistent with the underlying
DSGE model.
Third, the existing literature focuses exclusively on the reactions of the exchange rate. In this
paper, we do not only consider how exchange rates move in response to unexpected monetary policy
shocks but also assess whether such shocks impact exchange rate volatility (or uncertainty).1 Since
exchange rate volatility is unobserved, we estimate the volatility process alongside the remaining
model quantities. The resulting model is closely related to Carriero et al. (2018) and Mumtaz
and Theodoridis (2019) and assumes that exchange rate volatility is a function of the remaining
quantities in the model.
Our findings can be summarized as follows. Consistent with the literature, we find that the
exchange rate appreciates in response to a US monetary contraction. In contrast to much of the
literature, we, however, do not find evidence for delayed overshooting of the exchange rate.2 Our
findings on the precise shape of the exchange rate responses are somewhat heterogeneous across
countries, but can be summarized as follows: for the case of US monetary policy shocks we find
that the immediate degree of appreciation falls short of the long-run degree of appreciation, i.e.,
we find evidence of exchange rate undershooting. For the country pairs of US-Euro Area and US-
UK, the amount of undershooting is only mild (so that the extent of exchange rate appreciation is
similar quantitatively in the short and long run), in the case of US-Japan, the dollar undershoots
its long-run level of appreciation more strongly. For monetary policy shocks originating abroad, our
findings partly mirror the ones from US monetary shocks: for the country pairs of US-Euro Area and
US-Japan the dollar depreciates, though the degree of depreciation undershoots the depreciation
the dollar experiences in the long-run. Only for the country pair of US-UK and the case of a UK
1For studies that deal with the determinants of exchange rate volatility, see, e.g., Rose (1996), Rose and Flood (1999),
Devereux and Lane (2003).
2In a recent contribution, Kim et al. (2017) document that delayed overshooting is a result of the Volcker-period, and
does not apply to the post-Volcker sample period.
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monetary contraction, we observe an exchange rate response more in line with the exchange rate
overshooting hypothesis. The findings of exchange rate undershooting from our novel empirical
framework are in line with some more recent contributions in the literature. Mu¨ller et al. (2019),
use local projections to study exchange rates behavior in response to monetary shocks and similarly
find evidence for exchange rate undershooting. Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2018) estimate a state-
space model with temporary and permanent monetary policy shocks – in response to both types of
shocks, the exchange rate, in their setting, undershoots. A novel aspect of our empirical framework
is that it allows studying the consequences for exchange rate volatility in response to the monet-
ary contraction. In most cases, we find that monetary shocks lead to an increase in exchange rate
volatility, again, with some heterogeneity across country pairs and source of monetary contraction
(home or abroad). In response to US monetary contractions, exchange rate volatility increases sig-
nificantly, but with a considerable lag of about ten quarters for the country pairs US-Euro Area and
US-Japan, while it shows no reaction for the case of US-UK. The lag in the volatility responses stands
in contrast to findings of a recent paper by (Mumtaz and Theodoridis, 2019), who find immediate
effects on macroeconomic volatility in response to monetary shocks – the setting, however, is rather
different, as their framework is a closed economy, and we focus exclusively on the effects on ex-
change rate volatility, as the exchange rate is at the core of the international monetary transmission
mechanism. For monetary shocks originating abroad, we observe increases in exchange volatility
that are more immediate, though not always strongly significant. Finally, to gain an understand-
ing for the importance of monetary shocks as a source of fluctuations in the level and volatility of
exchange rate fluctuations, we also perform forecast error variance and historical decompositions.
While the forecast error variance decompositions indicate that monetary policy shocks explain a
small fraction of the variation in the exchange rate and its volatility, the quantitative contributions
in terms of historical decompositions are large, especially during the first half of the sample up to
and including the ERM crisis and its aftermaths. Focusing on exchange rate volatility, we find that,
historically, US monetary policy shocks appear to have stabilizing effects.
The remainder of the paper is structured in the following way. Section 2 outlines the two-
country DSGE model that serves as the basis for both prior construction and identification of the
empirical model. Section 3 presents the empirical framework, a nonlinear Bayesian VAR model
with stochastic volatility while section 4 presents the empirical findings of the paper. Finally, the
last section summarizes and concludes the paper.
2 A two-country DSGE model
Below we lay out the theoretical dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model that serves
as a basis for obtaining priors for the empirical VAR model. We employ a small-scale two coun-
try monetary model that allows us to study the transmission of monetary policy shocks, as well
as (other) demand and supply shocks. Households in each country have preferences over con-
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sumption of domestically and foreign produced goods. The firm sector in each country produces
a country-specific good, but is otherwise modeled in the typical fashion of New Keynesian models:
a continuum of firms operate under monopolistic competition and are subject to nominal rigidit-
ies in their price setting. We largely follow Lubik and Schorfheide (2005), who have estimated a
similar-sized model with Bayesian methods and who, in their model choice, carefully evaluate the
trade-offs of potential misspecification of small and stylized models with potential identification and
computational costs of larger-scale models. Despite being a small-scale New Keynesian model at the
individual country level, our two-country version estimates roughly the same number of structural
parameters and fits the model to the same number of time series as a medium-scale estimated model
like Smets and Wouters (2007).
We deviate from the model setup of Lubik and Schorfheide (2005) in only two ways. One, we
explicitly introduce country size into the model, as we estimate the model also on country pairs that
are very unequal in terms of economic size. Two, a difference arising from the technical constraint
to keep the number of shocks equal to the number of observed time series is that we abstract from
a (common across countries) permanent productivity shock.3
2.1 Sketch of the model
The world economy consists of a Home country (H) and a Foreign country (F), each of which
is specialized in the production of one type of tradable good. Households and firms are defined
over a continuum of unit mass. Home and Foreign households are indexed by j ∈ [0, n] and j∗ ∈
(n, 1], respectively. Foreign variables carry an asterisk. Unless necessary otherwise, in the following
we only discuss the problem of Home agents, with an understanding that Foreign agents face an
equivalent problem.
2.1.1 Households
The domestic household j maximizes her lifetime expected utility, given by:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{(
[(Ct (j)− hCt−1 (j)) /Zt]1−σc
1− σc
)
+ ψ
Lt (j)
1+σl
1 + σl
}
, (1)
where Ct (j) is household j’s aggregate consumption, Lt (j) is labor supply. Zt is the nonstationary
level of technology, where we define γz,t = Zt/Zt−1 = γz, where γz is the gross quarterly growth
rate, assumed to be identical across countries. Parameters β, σc, σl, and h stand for the discount
factor, the coefficient of risk aversion, the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply and the habit
3We also explored a third deviation from Lubik and Schorfheide (2005), allowing for incomplete financial markets, which
a recent literature has emphasized to be important in helping to match exchange rate related empirical stylized facts.
See the next section for a brief discussion of this avenue.
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parameter, respectively. The aggregate consumption index of household j is defined as
Ct(j) =
[
γ
1

c C
−1

H,t (j) + (1− γc)
1
C
−1

F,t (j)
] 
−1
, (2)
with γc denoting the degree of home bias in consumption, and  is the elasticity of substitution (or
trade elasticity) between domestic, CH,t (j), and foreign goods, CF,t (j). The household’s consump-
tion of domestically (foreign) produced goods, CH,t (j) (CF,t (j)), is, again, modeled as a basket of
the individual varieties of home (foreign) goods
CH,t(j) =
( 1
n
) 1
θ
n∫
0
ct(h, j)
θ−1
θ dh
 θθ−1 , CF,t(j) =
( 1
1− n
) 1
θ
1∫
n
ct(f, j)
θ−1
θ df

θ
θ−1
, (3)
whereby θ is the elasticity of substitution between varieties, ct(h, j) (ct(f, j)). Given this setup, the
household’s demand functions can be derived as:
ct (h, j) =
1
n
(
pt (h)
PH,t
)−θ
CH,t(j), ct (f, j) =
1
1− n
(
pt (f)
PF,t
)−θ
CF,t(j),
CH,t(j) = γc
(
PH,t
Pt
)−
Ct(j), CF,t(j) = (1− γc)
(
PF,t
Pt
)−
Ct(j).
Household j maximizes equation (1) subject to the budget constraint. Each period household j
receives (nominal) wage income, WtLt(j), and (nominal) dividends from the monopolistic firms
they own, Dt (j), and has to finance lump-sum tax payments, Tt (j), and consumption expenditure
PtCt(j).
The availability of any assets of domestic household j depends on the assumptions of the struc-
ture of international financial markets, where we follow the original model of Lubik and Schorfheide
(2005) in assuming complete markets: in this case the household has access to a full set of state-
contingent (Arrow-Debreu) securities. Let Q(st+1|st) denote the price of one unit of Home currency
delivered in period t+1 contingent on the state of nature at t+1 being st+1. With complete markets,
Q(st+1|st) is the same for all individuals. Let BH,t (j, st+1) denote the claim to BH,t units of Home
currency at time t + 1 in the state of nature st+1, that household j buys at time t and brings into
time t + 1. The nominal interest rate can be expressed as Rt = 1/
∑
st+1
Q(st+1|st). The budget
constraint under complete markets is then given by:∑
st+1
Q(st+1|st)BH,t (j, st+1) ≤ BHt−1(j, st) +WtLt(j) +Dt (j)− Tt (j)− PtCt(j). (4)
We should note that an integral part of coming up with a suitable two-country model to base
the priors of our empirical model on was to explore the role of international financial markets for
the ability to explain exchange rate behavior. Several recent contributions, most prominently Cor-
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setti et al. (2008), as well as Heathcote and Perri (2002), Enders and Mueller (2009), and Rabitsch
(2012; 2016) emphasize the importance of a low trade elasticity, especially when coupled with
incomplete international financial markets, as key in addressing exchange rate empirical stylized
facts, such as its high observed volatility, or the Backus-Smith puzzle (cf. Backus and Smith, 1993).
We therefore explored estimating an alternative model version also with incomplete financial mar-
kets, assuming that both countries can engage in financial trade only through trade in one-period
nominal bonds. While advantageous from a theoretical perspective, we (in the end) stick to the
complete-markets version as the baseline model mostly for technical complications in the estima-
tion of the incomplete-markets version.4
The households first order conditions with respect to consumption and labor are,
Λt (j) =
(
Ct (j)− hγzCt−1 (j)
Zt
)−σc 1
Zt
+ β
(
− hγz
Zt+1
)(
Ct+1 (j)− hγzCt
Zt+1
)
, (5)
ψLt (j)
σl = Λt (j)
Wt(h, j)
Pt
.
The optimality condition with respect to the internationally traded Arrow-Debreu securities can be
written, for the domestic and the foreign country (who faces a symmetric problem)
Q(st+1|st) = βEt
{
Λt+1 (j)
Λt (j)
Pt
Pt+1
}
, Q(st+1|st) =
{
Λ∗t+1 (j)
Λ∗t (j)
P ∗t
P ∗t+1
εt
εt+1
}
, (6)
where εt denotes the nominal exchange rate, expressed as units of Home currency per unit of For-
eign currency (so that an increase in εt implies a Home (dollar) depreciation). The above domestic
and foreign optimality condition can be combined and forward-solved to obtain the risk sharing
condition: full risk-sharing at the international level equates the ratio of marginal utilities across
countries to the real exchange rate, up to a constant κ which depends on initial conditions:
εtP
∗
t
Pt
= κ
Λ∗t (j)
Λt (j)
. (7)
2.1.2 Firms
Home and Foreign goods come in many varieties, each produced by a single firm, indexed by
h ∈ [0, n] for domestic and f ∈ (n, 1] for foreign firms. Each domestic firm h specializes in one
variety producing according to a Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yt (h) = AtZtLt (h) . (8)
4In particular, the incomplete-markets setup gives rise to a discontinuity in the model likelihood, related to a model
behavior that is discontinuous in the parameter of the trade elasticity, ε.
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Firms operate under monopolistic competition and each set a common price (in their own currency)
in the local and foreign market so as to maximize profits, taking as given the households’ demand
for that good, at (h),
at (h) =
(
pt (h)
PH,t
)−θ (
CH,t +
1− n
n
C∗H,t +Gt
)
=
(
pt (h)
PH,t
)−θ
Yt.
The firm is subject to quadratic price adjustment costs in re-setting the price, with price adjustment
cost parameter αH .5 Defining (nominal) marginal cost, MCt (h) = WtAtZt , the firm’s problem is
therefore, choosing pt (h), to maximize:
Et
∞∑
t=0
Ω0,t
{[
pt (h)
PHt
τ − MCt (h)
PHt
] [(
pt (h)
PH,t
)−θ
Yt
]
− αH
2
(
pt (h)
pt−1 (h)
− piH
)2
Yt
}
. (9)
The firm’s optimal price setting, imposing symmetry across firms results in:[
θ
MCt
PHt
− (θ − 1) τ
]
= αH (piHt − piH)piHt − Ωt,t+1αH (piHt+1 − piH)piHt+1Yt+1
Yt
, (10)
with piH,t being producer price inflation, defined as piH,t = PH,t/PH,t−1, Yt denoting aggregate
output, and τ is a production subsidy that offsets the markup from monopolistic competition.
Following Lubik and Schorfheide (2005) and Monacelli (2005), we assume that endogenous de-
viations from purchasing power parity (PPP) arise due to the existence of monopolistically compet-
itive importers. In particular, domestic consumers cannot purchase foreign-produced goods directly
from foreign firms, but only from monopolistically competitive importers. Importers buy foreign
goods at world-market prices εtp∗t (f), and sell these goods, charging a markup over their cost, to
domestic consumers at price pt (f).6 Their optimization problem reads:
max
pt(f)
Et
∞∑
t=0
Ω0,t
{[
pt (f)
PFt
τ − εtp∗t (f)
] [(
pt (f)
PF,t
)−θ nCF,t
1− n
]
− αF
2
(
pt (f)
pt−1 (f)
− piF
)2 nCF,t
1− n
}
(11)
resulting in a law of motion for piF,t = PF,t/PF,t−1 similar to equation (10),[
θ
εtP
∗
Ft
PFt
− (θ − 1) τ
]
= αF (piFt − piF )piFt − Ωt,t+1αF (piFt+1 − piF )piFt+1CF,t+1
CF,t
. (12)
5In the estimation process, we do not estimate parameter αH directly, but a parameter ξH in a parameter transformation
that has the interpretation of an equivalent Calvo setup, αH = ξH [(θ−1)τ ](1−βξH )(1−ξH ) .
6Alternatively, one may have assumed that a share of firms ωLCP set the price in the foreign market in not their own
(producer) currency, but in the currency of the local market (local currency pricing), which would result a similar non-
linear Phillips-curve relationship as equation (10), together with an equation that models piF,t as a weighted average of
the law of motion implied by that additional Phillips curve (with weight ωLCP ) and the dynamics that would be implied
by the law of one price (with weight (1− ωLCP )), allowing for intermediate degrees of exchange rate pass through.
As this alternative setup requires a higher number of estimated model parameters to capture the same dynamics, we
preferred the modeling strategy reported in the main text.
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2.1.3 The government
The monetary authority is assumed to apply a Taylor-style interest-feedback rule. The interest rate
is related to CPI inflation and output, in deviation from their long-run value, and exchange rate
changes according to:
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)ρR [(pit
pi
)ρpi (Yt
Y
)ρY
(∆εt)
ρ∆ε
]1−ρR
eR,t . (13)
The fiscal authority keeps a balanced budget and finances its government expenditure entirely
through lump-sum taxes each period, i.e. Gt = Tt.
2.1.4 Market clearing and exogenous processes
Arrow-Debreu securities are in zero net supply:
n∫
0
BH,t(j)dj +
1∫
n
B∗H,t(j
∗)dj∗ = 0,
1∫
n
B∗F,t(j
∗)dj∗ = 0. (14)
Equilibrium in the factor markets requires:
Lt =
n∫
0
Lt (h) dh, L
∗
t =
1∫
n
L∗t (f) df. (15)
Goods market clearing gives:
AtZtLt =
[
CH,t +Gt +
1−n
n C
∗
H,t
]
, A∗tZ∗t L∗t =
[
n
1−nCF,t + C
∗
F,t +G
∗
t
]
. (16)
The model is subject to seven exogenous disturbances. A domestic and foreign monetary shock,
R,t and ∗R,t affecting the short-term nominal interest rates in the Taylor rule, equation (13). Coun-
try specific technology levels and government expenditures follow:
logAt = ρA logAt−1 + A,t, logA∗t = ρ∗A logA
∗
t−1 + ∗A,t, (17)
gt = ρggt−1 + (1− ρg) g + g,t, g∗t = ρ∗gg∗t−1 +
(
1− ρ∗g
)
g + ∗g,t. (18)
Here gt = 1/ (1− ξt), and government expenditure, Gt, is a fraction ξt of output, Gt = ξtYt. Finally,
we follow Lubik and Schorfheide (2005) in specifying the final shock as a non-structural shock
capturing deviations in purchasing power parity (PPP) that are not otherwise captured in the model,
denoted PPP,t.
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2.1.5 Observables
The model is estimated on quarterly data for the period of 1970:Q2 to 2016:Q4. We use the same
seven variables as observables to estimate the DSGE model that we will carry in our VAR model
of section 3: the quarterly growth rates of log GDP at home and abroad, ∆Y obst and ∆Y
∗obs
t ,
annualized inflation rates, piobst and pi
∗obs
t , annualized nominal interest rates, R
obs
t and R
obs
t , and the
change in the bilateral nominal exchange rate, ∆εobst . Our observables are related to DSGE-model
variables as:
∆Y obst = γ
q
z + ŷt − ŷt−1, ∆Y ∗obst = γqz + ŷ∗t − ŷ∗t−1,
Robst = pi
ss + rss + 4γqz + 4R̂t, R
∗obs
t = pi
ss + rss + 4γqz + 4R̂∗t ,
piobst = pi
ss + pit, pi
∗obs
t = pi
ss + pi∗t ,
∆εobst = ε̂t − ε̂t−1 + PPP,t,
(19)
where a variable with a hat indicates percentage deviations of that variable from its steady state,
i.e. for any variable Xt, X̂t = log(Xt/X). Parameter γ
q
z denotes the quarterly growth rate of GDP
in percent, so that γz = 1+
γqz
100 ; parameters pi
ss and rss denote the annualized steady state inflation
rate and the real interest rate in percent, respectively, which, together with γqz determine the model’s
discount factor β =
(
1 + r
ss
400
)−1. Appendix A provides detailed information on all data sources and
transformations.
2.2 DSGE parameters and estimations results
This section briefly discusses DSGE parameters for the different country-pairs we estimate our model
on. In particular, we combine data on the Euro Area, UK, and Japan with US data. In each case, a
country pair is assumed to make up the world economy, that is, a ’rest of the world’ is not explicitly
modeled.
A small subset of model parameters is not estimated, but calibrated. Country size, n, is computed
from a country’s share of real GDP at PPP in ’world’ GDP over the 1970-2016 sample. That is, for
the estimation of country pair US and Euro Area, n = Y US/(Y US + Y EA) = 0.56. For the other
country pairs, US-UK n = 0.87, and for US-Japan n = 0.76. The parameters related to the home bias
preference parameter, the weight of the Home and the Foreign country on their own goods in their
respective consumption baskets are calibrated as one minus the long-term averages of the import
share, which is obtained as Imp/(GDP − Exp + Imp), found to be 0.1034 and 0.1166 for the US
economy and for the Euro Area, respectively.7 The import shares for the other countries are equal
to 0.26 for the UK and 0.11 for Japan. The elasticity of substitution between varieties is set to 6,
implying that prices are set at a markup of 20% above marginal costs on average. Finally, the ratio
of government expenditure to GDP is 0.2. All other model parameters are estimated.
7For the Euro Area, we considered Extra Euro Area imports and exports, since we are interested in the openness with
respect to outside of the region.
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Table B.1 in Appendix B.2 presents a summary table of prior distributions, prior means and
standard estimations, and estimated posterior means together with the 16% and 84% HPD intervals
for all country pairs.
For simplicity, we employ the same prior assumptions irrespective of the country pair. We do not
comment in detail on the estimated parameter values, but only highlight a couple of key findings.
Like Lubik and Schorfheide (2005) we find, for most country pairs, (extremely) low values of the
trade elasticity, ; we do not find this surprising, as in a setting of internationally complete markets
exchange rate volatility is a decreasing function of the trade elasticity (cf. Corsetti et al., 2008;
Rabitsch, 2012; 2016). Finding low estimated values of the trade elasticity thus can be interpreted
as the model’s attempt to explain as much exchange rate variation as possible endogenously in the
model. Nonetheless, and again similar to the findings in Lubik and Schorfheide (2005), we find a
large standard deviation of the PPP shock, reflecting the difficulty of theoretical two-country models
in generating sizeable fluctuations in exchange rates, so that a large remainder of this volatility is
captured by the exogenous PPP shock.8 In contrast to Lubik and Schorfheide, we find quite sizable
values of the standard deviations of the productivity shocks, σA and σ∗A. We explain this through
the fact that we (needed to) abstract from a (common across countries) permanent productivity
shock to keep the number of shocks equal to the number of observed time series, in which case a lot
of variation is attributed to the two countries’ temporary technology disturbances.9 For most other
parameters the estimation results are within a reasonable range.
2.3 DSGE-based impulse responses: building some intuition
Figure 1 presents impulse responses to monetary policy shocks arising from the DSGE model across
our three country pairs. For each country pair, the first row depicts the responses to a domestic
(US) contractionary shock, while the second row depicts the responses to a contractionary monetary
shock in the foreign country (Euro Area, United Kingdom or Japan, respectively).
To lay out the economic intuition, let us start by focusing on the US-based monetary policy
shock in the US-Euro Area country pair, i.e. on row 1 of Figure 1. The responses of US macroe-
conomic variables (Y , P , R) follow the standard logic of New Keynesian macroeconomic models.
The unanticipated monetary contraction raises the nominal interest rate, which, because of nominal
rigidities translates into an increase of the real rate. The higher real interest rate incentivizes house-
holds to delay their consumption and increase their savings. In response to the resulting decrease
8As mentioned, we explored avenues that recent contributions emphasize can generate high exchange rate volatility (cf.
Corsetti et al., 2008; Rabitsch, 2012; 2016), such as an incomplete financial markets setting coupled with a low trade
elasticity. Estimating (on, e.g. the US-EA country pair) a model version with incomplete financial markets we, however,
obtained a similarly high value of σppp, suggesting that exogenous factors of variations remain necessary to similar
degrees. Since the behavior of the exchange rate under incomplete financial markets is known to switch sign at an
asymptotic threshold value of the trade elasticity, the incomplete markets model version, unfortunately, also gives rise
to a discontinuous model likelihood. We therefore prefer to stick to the complete markets case.
9In fact, in a version with the permanent productivity shock, estimated on US-Euro Area for the sample used in Lubik
and Schorfheide (2005), we obtain virtually identical results.
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Fig. 1: Impulse responses to monetary policy shocks in the US and the foreign economy from the
estimated DSGE model: Euro area, UK, and Japan
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Notes: This figure presents impulse responses at the posterior mean and the 16% and 84% interval for: US output
(Y ), foreign output (Y ∗), US inflation (pi), foreign inflation (pi∗), US nominal interest rate (R), foreign nominal
interest rate (R∗), and US-foreign nominal exchange rate, (ε).
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in consumption demand, firms respond by lowering prices, but because of nominal rigidities only a
fraction of firms is able to do so, implying that on average, prices stay too high.10 Output thus is
demand determined and drops as well.
Next, let us turn to discussing responses of macroeconomic variables in the foreign economy
(Y ∗, P ∗, R∗), the Euro Area, together with the exchange rate response (ε). In response to the
US monetary contraction, the exchange rate experiences an appreciation. Since exchange rate
dynamics are at the core of this paper, we will discuss the mechanisms at work in driving the
appreciation in detail below. For now, we focus on the effect that such exchange rate appreciation
has on foreign macroeconomic variables. In particular, the response of output in the foreign country
is a result of different forces at play. In a model version without nominal rigidities at the importer
level (αF = α∗H = 0) our theoretical setup would correspond to a standard complete markets
economy with producer currency pricing, such as widely studied in the literature (cf. Obstfeld and
Rogoff, 2002; Corsetti and Pesenti, 2005; Corsetti et al., 2010). In this case, the law of one price
would hold and an exchange rate appreciation would be fully passed through into import prices at
the consumer level, and would lead to expenditure switching effects, i.e., a switching of both home
and foreign demand away from home goods toward foreign goods,11 leading foreign output and
inflation to expand. However, the assumption of a Calvo price setting mechanism of monopolistic
importers implies that pass-through of exchange rate movements into import prices is complete only
at the border level, but does not, generally, hold at the consumer level. Since the law of one price
does no longer hold, expenditure switching effects are absent – in fact, both countries’ demands
for both home and foreign goods contract – CH and C∗H but also CF and C
∗
F fall (not reported in
Figure 1). As a result, the output response abroad, Y ∗, is slightly negative as well (panel 2, row
1 of Figure 1), so that the contraction of the US economy spills over to the foreign economy, and
the contraction in Euro Area output also decreases the Euro Area price level, P ∗ (panel 4, row 1 of
Figure 1).
Exchange rate movements in our model are determined by the same forces emphasized origin-
ally in Dornbusch (1976). Long-run behavior is determined by purchasing parity, together with
short-run variations being driven by uncovered interest rate parity. The latter condition holds be-
cause of the assumption of complete financial markets made in our model economy. More specific-
ally, in the long run, once nominal rigidities play no role in affecting the macroeconomy and all
prices have adjusted, the US monetary contraction leads to a lower US price level. The exchange
rate in the long run thus appreciates in order to restore purchasing power parity. In the short run, as
domestic interest rates exceed foreign rates after the home monetary contraction, investors expect
10Note that the price level and the level of the nominal exchange rate are not pinned down in the DSGE model, only their
respective rates of change; Figure 1 nonetheless plots the impulse response in terms of level variables (by cumulating
up impulse responses of pit or ∆εt) as it is customary in the literature studying international transmission of monetary
shocks and exchange rate behavior.
11That is, CH and C∗H would fall, and CF and C
∗
F would rise.
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a depreciation, as dictated by the uncovered interest rate parity condition, (Rt/R∗t ) = Etεt+1/εt.12
Expectations of an exchange appreciation in the long-run are consistent with expectations of a de-
preciation in the short-run only if the exchange rate overshoots its long-run level of appreciation
initially. This famous exchange rate overshooting result was originally suggested in Dornbusch
(1976) as the first explanation of the large variability of exchange rates observed in the data.
The exchange rate behavior in response to monetary shocks has since been an extensive topic
of research. Early influential empirical studies following Dornbusch, by Eichenbaum and Evans
(1995) and Grilli and Roubini (1995), found evidence of exchange rate overshooting, however,
not on impact of the shock, but appearing with a lag of several years after the shock, i.e. delayed
overshooting. This finding was rationalized mostly through deviations in uncovered interest rate
parity for which there is wide empirical evidence (literature reviews include the contributions by
Froot and Thaler, 1990; Engel, 1996; Bacchetta, 2013).
The results on delayed overshooting were challenged by a number of authors (cf. Kim and
Roubini, 2000a; Faust and Rogers, 2003a; Bjornland, 2009), partly because of the recursive identi-
fication assumptions of early contributions. However, evidence for delayed overshooting has been
presented across various alternative specifications and identification assumptions since, such as,
e.g. in Kim (2005); Scholl and Uhlig (2008); Bouakez and Normadin (2010)). In a more recent
study Kim et al. (2017) document that the delayed overshooting result is a result primarily of the
Volcker era and is no longer found in the more recent time period post-Volcker. They also provide
evidence that in the post-Volcker era uncovered interest rate parity holds conditional on monet-
ary shocks (while it continues to fail unconditionally). Finally, Mu¨ller et al. (2019), and similarly
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2018), find not only no evidence for a delay in overshooting, but actually
a lack of overshooting entirely. In their empirical setups, the exchange rate appreciates in response
to a US contractionary monetary shock, but the short-run degree of appreciation actually falls short
of its long-run appreciation, i.e. they find evidence for ’exchange rate undershooting’.
Given the widely differing results on the precise dynamic responses of the exchange rate to a
contractionary monetary shock – overshooting, delayed overshooting, or undershooting– our paper
pursues the strategy of drawing inference based on a well grounded theoretical model. While
our model –with complete markets and UIP holding perfectly– is stylized, generating overshooting
dynamics along the lines suggested by Dornbusch (1976), we believe that it nonetheless provides
a reasonable basis for forming a Bayesian prior for the empirical model. On the one hand, some
recent evidence by, e.g. Kim et al. (2017) points against a delayed overshooting exchange rate
response and towards UIP holding conditionally on monetary shocks. On the other hand, our prior,
described in detail in subsection 3.2, is flexible enough to let the data speak and thus, if necessary,
depart from the theoretically implied parameter restrictions.
12The uncovered interest rate parity condition can formally be derived by combining the foreign country’s Euler condition
with respect to the Home country’s Arrow-Debreu security, with the foreign country’s Euler condition with respect to its
own Arrow-Debreu security.
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3 Empirical framework
This section starts by discussing the proposed empirical model, a non-linear vector autoregression,
in subsection 3.1 while subsection 3.2 discusses the Bayesian prior setup.
3.1 A non-linear vector autoregressive model
To investigate how macroeconomic shocks determine exchange rate volatility, we propose a novel
macroeconometric framework that is similar in spirit to Carriero et al. (2018). In the previous
section, we assumed that the latent states zt in the underlying DSGE model drive a set ofm observed
quantities in yt. Here, we assume that yt follows a VAR process of order p. In what follows, we
assume that the exchange rate equation is ordered last, implying that ymt = ∆εobst .
Before describing how our VAR model is defined, we introduce a law of motion that links lags
of yt with the logarithm of exchange rate volatility, defined as ht. Specifically, ht follows,
ht = φ1ht−1 + · · ·+ φpht−p + β′1yt−1 + . . . ,+β′pyt−p + vt, (20)
whereby φj (j = 1, . . . , p) are autoregressive parameters associated with lags of ht while βj denote
m-dimensional vectors of regression coefficients that link ht to the lags of yt. The shocks vt are
normally distributed with zero mean and variance σ2h.
Consistent with the structural model outlined in Section 2, the reduced-form representation of
the VAR model for yt is given by,
yt = A1yt−1 + · · ·+Apyt−p + γ1ht−1 + . . .γpht−p + ηt. (21)
Here, we let Aj (j = 1, . . . , p) denote m × m matrices of VAR coefficients associated with lagged
values of yt and γj are m-dimensional coefficient vectors that relate the lags of ht to yt. Moreover,
we assume that ηt ∼ N (0m,Σt) is a vector white noise process with Σt being a time-varying
variance-covariance matrix that can be decomposed as
Σt = UΩtU
′, (22)
with U denoting a lower triangular matrix with diag(U) = ιm and ιm being an m-dimensional
vector of ones while Ωt = diag(eω1t , . . . , eωmt) is a diagonal matrix that varies over time.
The ωjt’s obey the following law of motion,
ωjt =
µj + ρj(ωjt−1 − µj) + ujt for j = 1, . . . ,m− 1,ht if j = m, (23)
with µj (j = 1, . . . ,m − 1) denoting the long-run unconditional mean, ρj the autoregressive para-
meter (with |ρj | < 1), and ujt ∼ N (0, σ2u) is a white noise shock with innovation variance σ2u.
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Equation (23) implies that for the elements in yt other than the exchange rate equation, the error
variances feature a standard stochastic volatility specification. For the exchange rate equation, we
assume that the volatility evolves according to the law of motion described in Eq. (20).
One important feature of our proposed model is that Eq. (20) can be viewed as an additional
equation in the VAR model. In order to allow for contemporaneous relations across the observed
quantities in yt and the log-volatility of the exchange rate ht, we assume that the shocks to the
exchange rate volatility equation and the reduced form innovations in the VAR are correlated. More
specifically, this implies that (
vt
ηt
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
wt
∼ N (0m+1,Ξt), (24)
Ξt =
(
σ2h ξ
′
ξ Σt
)
, (25)
where 0m+1 denotes an (m+1)-dimensional vector of zeros, Ξt = QRtQ′ represents a time-varying
variance-covariance matrix and ξ is a m-dimensional vector that stores the covariances between vt
and ηt. The lower uni-triangular matrix Q is the lower Cholesky factor of Ξt and Rt is a diagonal
matrix. Multiplication of wt, the vector of reduced form shocks, with Q−1 from the left yields a set
of uncorrelated shocks w˜t ∼ N (0,Rt).
The assumption of correlated shocks implies that our stochastic volatility specification for the
exchange rate closely resembles a multivariate stochastic volatility model with leverage (Yu, 2005;
Omori et al., 2007). Notice, however, that in contrast to standard stochastic volatility models with
leverage, the proposed specification also assumes that lagged values of ht enter the observation
equations across the system.
3.2 Prior setup
The model described in subsection 3.1 is heavily parameterized and the involved time series are
quite short. This calls for Bayesian techniques to carry out estimation and inference. Conducting a
Bayesian analysis requires the specification of suitable priors on the parameters of the model. This
joint prior distribution is then combined with the likelihood function to obtain a joint posterior dis-
tribution over the parameters and latent quantities in the model. Before proceeding to the specific
prior setup, it turns out to be convenient to rewrite the empirical model as follows:
zt = Bdt +wt, (26)
where zt = (ht,y′t)′, B = (β,A)′, β = (β′1, . . . ,β′p, φ1, . . . , φp)′,A = (A1, . . . ,Ap,γ, . . . ,γp)′ and
dt = (y
′
t−1, . . . ,y′t−p, ht−1, . . . , ht−p)′.
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Using theoretical models as prior distributions for VAR models dates at least back to the sem-
inal contributions of Ingram and Whiteman (1994) and Del Negro and Schorfheide (2004). The
key advantage of this approach is that information arising from some structural model can easily
be combined with data information to improve estimation accuracy and softly introduce theoret-
ical restrictions on the parameter space. In its original form, the DSGE-prior of Del Negro and
Schorfheide (2004) is conjugate, implying that the functional form of the prior and likelihood are
identical, translating into a closed-form joint posterior distribution that also features the same dis-
tributional form. One key disadvantage, however, is that using DSGE models to form a conjugate
prior can be potentially restrictive because the likelihood function of the VAR model features a
Kronecker structure that speeds up computation but also implies that shrinkage towards the theor-
etically inspired restrictions. To ease this restriction, De Luigi and Huber (2018) propose using only
the DSGE-implied prior mean while estimating the prior variance-covariance matrix under a suit-
able shrinkage prior. In this paper, we adopt a similar approach that is based on using a hierarchical
modeling strategy.
The prior distribution on each of the k(= (m + 1)2p) elements of b = vec(B), denoted by
bj (j = 1, . . . , k), follows a conditionally Gaussian distribution,
bj |δj ∼ N (b0j , τj), (27)
where b0j denotes the jth element of a prior mean vector b0 = vec(B0) and τj is a prior scaling
parameter. Due to the fact that the DSGE model does not feature a separate equation for exchange
rate volatility, we need to construct the prior mean matrixB0 that centers the coefficients in Eq. (23)
on zero. The K × (m+ 1)-dimensional matrix B0 (with K = (m+ 1)p) is constructed as follows:
B0 =
(
0 0′m 0 . . . 0′m 0
0m Ψ1 0m . . . Ψp 0m
)′
(28)
with 0m denoting an m-dimensional vector of zeros, Ψj selects the coefficients associated with the
jth lag from the DSGE-implied prior mean matrix Ψ.
The prior scaling parameter τj plays a crucial role since it determines the weight placed on the
DSGE-implied moments embodied in b0j . In what follows, we estimate this weight by assuming that
τj depends on a set of binary indicators δj such that
τj = s0jδj + s1j(1− δj), (29)
with s0j being close to zero and s1j taking a large positive value such that s0j  s1j . Hence, if
δj = 1, we strongly push the posterior estimates aj towards the DSGE-implied prior mean while in
the case that δj = 0, we place little weight on the structural model. Since the parameters s0j and
s1j play a crucial role and depend on the scaling of the data, we follow Ishwaran and Rao (2005)
and assume that s0j = ζs1j , with ζ = 1/104 being a known constant close to zero. On s−11j , we place
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a Gamma prior,
s−11j ∼ G(d0, d1). (30)
Here, we let d0 and d1 denote hyperparameters that we specify to be only weakly informative.
More specifically, we set d0 = d1 = 0.01, translating into a prior mean of 1 and a prior variance of
0.01/0.012.
To complete the prior on the VAR coefficients, we need to specify the prior restriction probability
that a given estimate is forced towards the DSGE model, i.e. the probability that dj = 1. One
potential option would be to set Prob(δj = 1) = 1/2. However, here we follow a different approach
and assume that Prob(δj = 1) = p(n), where p(n) denotes the restriction probability related to the
nth equation in the system. Hence, if the jth element of a is associated with equation n, a different
restriction probability is adopted, effectively allowing for different restriction patterns across the
system of equations. Since prior information on p(n) is generally not available, we use a Beta
distributed prior, pnj ∼ B(1, 1), and consequently infer p(n) from the data. This captures the notion
that, a priori, all restrictions are equally likely.
The priors on the remaining quantities are standard. On the elements in ξ, we use Gaussian
priors centered on zero with prior variance 10. The same prior is adopted on the unconditional
mean of the log-volatility µj (j = 1, . . . ,m − 1). On ρj , we use a Beta prior ρj+12 ∼ B(25, 5) while
σ2u arises from a Gamma prior, σ
2
u ∼ G(1/2, 1/2). Finally, we use an inverted Gamma prior on
σ2h ∼ G−1(0.01, 0.01).
Inference is carried out using the algorithm discussed in Appendix C.1. Here, it suffices to note
that we repeat this algorithm 30,000 times and discard the first 15,000 draws as burn-in. Apart
from the draws of ht, the remaining parameters and states mix quite well, with inefficiency factors
below 15 in most cases. For ht, inefficiency factors are quite high but still acceptable.
4 Empirical results
This section starts by briefly summarizing identification issues. We then discuss selected reduced-
form results of our model in subsection 4.2 before presenting the structural responses of macroe-
conomic quantities other than the exchange rate to monetary policy shocks in subsection 4.3. In
subsection 4.4, we discuss the responses of the exchange rate and its volatility to monetary policy
shocks while subsection 4.5 shows historical and forecast error variance decompositions, respect-
ively.
4.1 Identification
The reduced-form nature of the model discussed in section 3 implies that structural inference can
only be carried out after identifying the structural shocks of interest. The empirical literature on
the effects of monetary policy on exchange rates typically exploits identification strategies based on
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zero (cf. Eichenbaum and Evans, 1995; Grilli and Roubini, 1995)) or sign (cf. Faust and Rogers,
2003a; Scholl and Uhlig, 2008; Bouakez and Normadin, 2010; Kim et al., 2017)) restrictions. Most
of these studies, however, find several empirical puzzles like the delayed exchange rate overshooting
puzzle. As a potential reason for this, the literature identifies either omitted variables (Sims, 1992a)
or identification issues. In both cases, the resulting impulse responses will be severely biased and
thus misleading. In this paper, we adopt a novel approach outlined in Del Negro and Schorfheide
(2004) and utilize the DSGE model to recover the structural representation of the empirical model.
The main identification issues stem from the relationship between the reduced-form and struc-
tural shocks given by:
wt = QΩ˜υt, υt ∼ N (0,Rt). (31)
Hereby, Ω˜ denotes an (m+ 1)× (m+ 1)-dimensional orthonormal matrix and υt are the structural
shocks. The identification issues stems from the fact that the reduced-form covariance matrix Ξt
can be decomposed as Ξt = QΩ˜Ω˜′Q′ for any rotation matrix Ω˜. Notice that if Ω˜ = Im+1, the
model is identified and we obtain a standard Cholesky-type identification scheme. In what follows,
we reorder the elements in zt as follows:
zt = (∆Y
obs
t ,∆Y
∗obs
t , ht, R
obs
t , R
∗obs
t , pi
obs
t , pi
∗obs
t ,∆ε
obs
t )
′.
In general, if sign restrictions are adopted, the resulting impulse responses will be invariant with
respect to reordering the elements in zt. Our identification strategy is only partially order invariant
since ht is not included in the DSGE model. Hence, we need to introduce additional restrictions to
fully identify the model.
Following Del Negro and Schorfheide (2004), the impact responses of the observed quantities
to the structural disturbances in the DSGE model are given by(
∂yt
∂υ′t
)
DSGE
= Q∗Ω∗, (32)
where Q∗ is a m×m-dimensional lower triangular matrix and Ω∗ denotes an orthonormal matrix,
also of dimension m × m. Del Negro and Schorfheide (2004) suggest using Ω∗ to identify the
reduced-form VAR model. However, since our DSGE model features no separate equation for ht, we
need to modify Ω∗ accordingly. This is achieved by setting
Ω˜ =
(
Q∗ 0m
0′m 1
)
. (33)
The main implication is that monetary policy shocks are identified by using information arising from
the structural model while the shock to ht is identified recursively. This recursive identification im-
plies that ht reacts contemporaneously to all shocks in the system while output growth at home
and abroad reacts sluggishly with respect to a shock to exchange rate volatility. However, since
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we are exclusively interested in the effects of domestic and international monetary policy shocks,
this additional restriction plays only a minor role in the subsequent discussion. Using this DSGE-
based identification scheme is novel in the literature that deals with the nexus between monetary
policy shocks and exchange rate fluctuations. One key advantage is that, as opposed to sign restric-
tions, this identification strategy yields a rotation matrix Ω˜ that is deterministic (conditional on an
estimated DSGE model), translating into a point identified model.
4.2 Reduced-form results
In this section, we briefly discuss selected reduced-form model features. Figure 2 shows the pos-
terior distribution of ht across the three country pairs considered. The solid light green lines refer
to the 16th and 84th percentiles of the posterior distribution, respectively. Moreover, the solid dark
green line denotes the posterior median of ht.
The figure indicates that the different estimates of ht display some similarities (especially so for
the Euro and the Pound). This suggests that the volatility of exchange rates vis-a´-vis the US dollar
exhibit a pronounced degree of comovement. This finding is consistent with the literature (see,
among many others, Diebold and Nerlove, 1989; Aguilar and West, 2000; Engel et al., 2015) that
reports strong comovements across the change and the volatility of several exchange rates against
the dollar. Across all country pairs under consideration, we observe that exchange rate volatility
peaks during the Volcker disinflation, the first gulf war and the crisis of the European exchange rate
mechanism (ERM) in the beginning of the 1990s and in the global financial crisis in 2008/2009.
Notice that we observe an appreciable increase in the volatility of the Pound surrounding the Brexit
referendum towards the end of the estimation sample. One interesting pattern is the secular de-
cline in the overall level of exchange rate volatility for the Euro and the Pound that started in the
beginning of the 1990s.
The next model feature we consider is the posterior distribution of the equation-specific weights
p(n). These weights illustrate how much weight is placed on the DSGE model, with values of p(n)
close to unity indicating that a lot of mass is placed on the DSGE-implied restrictions associated
with equation n’s coefficients. We find only little differences across country pairs, indicating that
there seems to be no systematic difference in the way the structural model fits the coefficients
for the selected economies. Considering differences across equations shows that, according to the
posterior median of p(n), the exchange rate equation receives the largest overall weight of around
0.4. This implies that on average, the theoretical moments of the structural model are introduced
with a probability of 40 percent across all coefficients. Equation (A.7), however, shows that p(n)
determines the variable-specific restriction probabilities, suggesting that there might be important
idiosyncratic deviations from this pattern. For the exchange rate equation, the corresponding DSGE-
implied moments translate into a prior mean that is sparse, centering most coefficients around
zero. The two exceptions are the coefficients associated with lagged interest rates at home and
abroad. For these two covariates, the algorithm strongly centers the final estimates around the
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Fig. 2: Posterior distribution of exchange rate volatility
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Notes: The figure shows the posterior distribution of eht/2 across the three exchange rate pairs considered. The dark
green line represents the posterior median while the light green lines denote the 16th/84th percentiles of the posterior
distribution.
prior moments whereas for the remaining covariates, we allow for non-zero regression coefficients.
For the remaining equations, we find weights that range from approximately 20 (in the case of Rt)
to 35 percent (in the case of ht, ∆Pt and ∆P ∗t ).
4.3 Dynamic responses of the macroeconomic quantities to monetary policy shocks
Before we discuss the responses of the exchange rate and its volatility, we assess how well the
reactions of the other macroeconomic quantities compare with existing results reported in the liter-
ature (see, for example, Eichenbaum and Evans, 1995; Cushman and Zha, 1997; Kim and Roubini,
2000b; Faust and Rogers, 2003b; Scholl and Uhlig, 2008).
To this end, Fig. 4 shows the impulse responses to a one standard deviation monetary policy
shock in the US and in the foreign country (i.e. the Euro Area, the United Kingdom, and Japan). The
responses arising from our empirical model can be considered a weighted average of the reactions
from an otherwise standard VAR model with stochastic volatility and the DSGE model used to a.)
inform the estimates of the VAR coefficients and b.) identify the empirical model. At a first glance,
the reactions show similarities with the ones obtained from the theoretical model, displaying some
variation across countries.
The reactions of real activity indicate that for all countries under consideration, US output de-
clines to both, a US-based and foreign monetary tightening. By contrast, we observe that foreign
output reactions appear to be much weaker and significant posterior mass is located above zero.
This is at odds with the responses from the estimated structural model, where output abroad de-
clines as well. However, as the discussion in subsection 2.3 suggested, an increase in foreign output
in response to a domestic monetary contraction is not at odds with a theoretical model where devi-
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Fig. 3: Posterior distribution of equation-specific weights p(n)
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Notes: The figure shows boxplots of the posterior distribution of the equation-specific weights across the three country
pairs considered.
ations from the law of one price are zero and where expenditure-switching effects would increase
demand for the foreign good.
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Across all countries and both types of monetary policy shocks considered, we observe that prices
persistently decline in reaction to a monetary tightening. This indicates that our model and identi-
fication approach succeeds in avoiding the well-known price puzzle (Sims, 1992b) that is associated
with inappropriate identification strategies in combination with small information sets.
Finally, considering the reactions of US short-term interest rates indicates that a US monetary
policy shock increases interest rates by around 0.25 percentage points on impact, with a peak
reaction of around 0.4 percentage points after around five quarters. This hump-shaped reaction
is interesting since it implies that interest rate reactions increase in magnitude over the first few
quarters. Considering the international reaction reveals some differences across country pairs. For
the Euro Area, the short-term interest rate tends to comove with US short-term interest rates. In
reaction to increases in US money market rates, interest rates in the Euro Area also tend to increase
with a slight lag. This finding, however, does not carry over to a foreign monetary policy shock. For
the case of the UK and Japan, the increase in US interest rates does not lead to spillovers abroad
since interest rate responses in the UK and Japan remain insignificant.
4.4 Dynamic responses of the exchange rates to monetary policy shocks
In this section, we focus on how monetary policy shocks impact the exchange rate and its volatility.
The upper part of Fig. 5 shows the reaction of the three currency pairs to a US-based monetary
policy shock while the lower part presents the reactions to a foreign monetary policy shock.
Starting with the upper panel of Fig. 5, we observe that across all country pairs, the US dollar
immediately appreciates. This is consistent with the reactions predicted by the DSGE model. No-
tice, however, that, for all country pairs, the DSGE model yields exchange rate responses in line
with Dornbusch’s overshooting hypothesis, so that the degree of appreciation on impact is more
pronounced than the long-run degree of appreciation to which the exchange rate depreciates to
monotonically.
The exchange rate reactions of the empirical model are more complex, and also differ somewhat
across country pairs. For the country pairs of US-Euro Area and the US-UK, the exchange rate
responses in the first few quarters appear to be consistent with the overshooting behavior of the
theoretical model, in that the degree of appreciation is high initially (in the first two quarters) and
then starts to decrease. In particular, the dollar appreciates by around 0.6 percent for the United
Kingdom and one percent for the Euro area within the first two quarters after the shock hit the
system.
After four to five quarters, this effect becomes smaller for the United Kingdom and the Euro
Area, reaching median values of 0.5 and 0.9 percent, respectively. Medium-run reactions appear to
be statistically insignificant. However, when we consider the median reactions, the results suggest
that exchange rate reactions become quantitatively stronger again over time. This is especially pro-
nounced for Japan, where the Yen persistently depreciates vis-a´-vis the US dollar in a statistically
significant manner. This at first sounds reminiscent of the delayed overshooting result (cf. Eichen-
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Fig. 4: Impulse responses to monetary policy shocks in the US and the foreign economy: Euro
area, United Kingdom and Japan
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Notes: This figure presents the posterior distribution of impulse responses alongside the 16th and 84th percentiles(in
dashed black) and the median response (in solid black). The columns represent the responses of the macroeconomic
quantities (excluding the exchange rate) to monetary policy shock in the US and the foreign country.
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baum and Evans, 1995; Grilli and Roubini, 1995)) in that also in this case the degree of exchange
rate appreciation in response to the monetary contraction is less pronounced on impact and grows
stronger in the medium run. However, unlike in the contributions on delayed overshooting, the
exchange rate remains at this high degree of appreciation also in the long run.13
Our novel empirical setup and identification approach thus finds that the short-run level of
appreciation undershoots its long-run level. These findings are consistent with some more recent
contributions. Mu¨ller et al. (2019), using local projections, also find evidence that exchange rates
tend to undershoot. Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2018) estimate a state-space model with temporary
and permanent monetary policy shocks, – they also find that, in response to both types of shocks,
the exchange rate undershoots. Concerning the short-run reactions, the immediate reactions of our
model are consistent with other studies (see, among others, Cushman and Zha, 1997; Zettelmeyer,
2004; Bjørnland, 2009).
Next, we consider the reactions of exchange rate volatility to US monetary policy shocks (see
the second row of the upper panel in Fig. 5). In principle, the effects of monetary policy (either ex-
pansionary or restrictive) on exchange rate variability is ambiguous. On the one hand, appropriate
monetary policy measures in reaction to asymmetric business cycle shocks that are accompanied
by elevated levels of exchange rate uncertainty could help calming the markets, reducing exchange
rate volatility. On the other hand, unexpected movements in interest rates increase, under the
assumption that UIP holds, the variability of the exchange rate.
Considering the volatility responses to US monetary policy shocks reveals that immediate re-
actions of exchange rate volatility tend to be insignificant, with significant posterior mass located
below zero across the three currencies considered. For the EUR/USD exchange rate, we observe
that exchange rate volatility increases after around ten quarters. For GBP/USD, the reaction of ex-
change rate volatility is insignificant throughout the impulse response horizon. For the JPY/USD
exchange rate, we find that volatility ticks up after around six quarters. Longer-run reactions for
this exchange rate pair appear to be persistent and remain significant for around 20 quarters.
These results indicate that it takes some time before volatility reacts in a statistically significant
manner. This rather slow reaction of ht appears to be inconsistent with the recent literature on
the relationship between monetary policy and macroeconomic volatility (Mumtaz and Theodoridis,
2019).
The exchange rate reactions with respect to foreign shocks are described in the lower panel of
Fig. 5. In response to a foreign monetary policy tightening, the US dollar depreciates across all
three country pairs considered, as expected. For two of our country pairs, US-Euro Area and US-
Japan, we obtain similar findings regarding the exchange rate reactions in the short-run versus in
the long-run as before. Specifically, we observe that the dollar depreciates against the Euro (Yen)
on impact, but the degree of dollar depreciation in early periods after the shock undershoots its
long-run degree of depreciation. By contrast, the dollar depreciation in response to a UK monetary
13While the impulse responses of Figure 5 only report 20 periods, the exchange rate remains at this level of appreciation
or continues to appreciate also, e.g., 60 periods after the shock or in the long run.
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policy contraction is strongest in the early periods after the shock, in line with the overshooting
hypothesis. Our findings thus suggest that the short-run effects of foreign monetary policy shocks
are similar across all three country pairs, in the sense that they all amount to a depreciation of
the dollar, and that short-run responses differ only quantitatively – with respect to the Euro, the
Pound and Yen the dollar depreciates by around 0.8, 0.5 and 0.9 percent on impact, respectively.
However, the long-run effects differ strongly. After around 20 quarters, the Euro and Yen appreciate
by around 1.5 and 2.5 percent vis-a´-vis the dollar, respectively, whereas the GBP/USD exchange
rate has reverted back to the level prior to the UK-based monetary contraction.
Volatility reactions, again, indicate that exchange rate volatility increases to a non-US monetary
policy shock. Compared to the case of the US-based shock, we observe that reactions are somewhat
faster, with the volatility of EUR/USD and JPY/USD increasing after around one quarter, but being
short-lived. For these two currency pairs, we find that the volatility reaction is only significant
within the first year and tends to fade out afterwards. This does not carry over to the case of the
Pound. Here we find that volatility increases after six quarters and remains significant over the
impulse response horizon.
4.5 Explaining exchange rate movements
Next, we assess whether monetary policy shocks determine exchange rate movements. This is
achieved by considering forecast error variance decompositions (FEVDs) and historical decompos-
itions (HDs). The FEVDs, shown in Fig. 6, tell a story about the quantitative relevance of US
and non-US-based shocks for explaining exchange rate forecast errors. By contrast, we show the
posterior mean of the HDs to investigate the role of monetary shocks in explaining exchange rate
behavior over time.
Considering the upper panel of Fig. 6 reveals that US monetary policy shocks explain around
five percent of the forecast error variance on impact and in the case of the Euro Area and the
United Kingdom while being markedly lower in the case of the Yen. Across all three country pairs,
we observe that these shares rise slightly over time, increasing by around one percentage point
on average. Inspection of the FEVDs of exchange rate volatility suggests that US monetary shocks
explain almost no variation in the short run. This share, however, increases to around four percent
after 20 quarters. The lower panel of Fig. 6 shows the FEVDs associated with the foreign monetary
policy shock. Similarly to the US monetary policy shock, we find some similarities across countries
in terms of the shape of the FEVDs. For all country pairs, the share of forecast error explained by a
foreign monetary policy shock increases slightly. In terms of magnitudes, differences in magnitudes
across countries are visible. In the case of the United Kingdom, the findings point towards a minor
role of non-US monetary shocks while this share is considerably higher for the Yen (reaching around
5 percent in the long run). Inspection of the volatility FEVDs shows that for the United Kingdom
and Japan, non-US shocks account for only 0.5 to one percent of the forecast error variance in the
longer run. In the Euro Area, this share is slightly higher and reaches around two percent after
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Fig. 5: Exchange rate responses (level and volatility) to monetary policy shocks in the US and the
foreign economy: Euro area, United Kingdom and Japan
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Notes: This figure presents the posterior distribution of impulse responses alongside the 16th and 84th percentiles(in
dashed black) and the median response (in solid black).
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Fig. 6: Forecast error variance decompositions for the exchange rate in the US and the foreign
economy: Contribution of monetary policy shocks
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Notes: This figure presents the posterior distribution of forecast error variance decompositions alongside the 16th
and 84th percentiles (in dashed black) and the median (in solid black).
20 months. Summing up, this discussion shows that, consistent with the literature (see, e.g., Kim
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Fig. 7: Historical decomposition: Change (left) and volatility (right)
and Roubini, 2000a), monetary policy shocks play a limited role in explaining forecast errors of
exchange rates and the corresponding volatility.
Fig. 7 shows the historical decompositions for exchange rate changes (left panel) and its volat-
ility (right panel). The contribution of a US monetary policy shock is marked in light red while the
contribution of a non-US monetary shock is shown in dark red. The HDs suggests that across all
currency pairs, the role of monetary policy shocks in driving exchange rate fluctuations decreased
markedly. Considering the left panel of the figure, we find that the determinants of exchange rate
changes shifted over time. Monetary policy shocks (both domestic and foreign) have been the
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main determinant for all three exchange rates considered. This is especially pronounced during
the period of the Volcker disinflation in the end of the 1970s. After the midst of the 1990s, the
contribution of monetary policy shocks vanishes across all three exchange rates considered.
Turning to the results for exchange rate volatility, we observe a pronounced degree of hetero-
geneity across the three currencies considered. Especially for the Euro Area, the HDs point towards
a stabilizing role of US monetary policy, with the contributions of US shocks being often negative
and thus reducing exchange rate volatility. Notice that Euro Area-based monetary policy shocks
contributed sharply to the pronounced increase in volatility during the crisis of the ERM. This pat-
tern can also be found for the GBP/USD exchange rate but with a different role of US monetary
policy shocks. Again, we observe that non-US shocks play a particularly strong role in determining
exchange rate volatility but, in contrast to the findings for the Euro Area, this also carries over to
US-based shocks. Similarly to the case of exchange rate changes, the quantitative contribution of
monetary shocks for GBP/USD declines sharply during the midst of the 1990s and remains muted
afterwards. For the EUR/USD and JPY/USD exchange rate, US monetary policy shocks generally
contributed to a decline in exchange rate volatility.
As compared to FEVDs, the analysis based on HDs reveals that monetary policy shocks contrib-
uted significantly to exchange rate fluctuations and movements in volatility during the first part
of the sample (up to the mid of the 1990s). For exchange rate volatility associated with the Euro
and the Yen, we also observe that US monetary policy disturbances lower the level of volatility,
suggesting a stabilizing role of US monetary policy.
5 Closing remarks
A large body of literature points towards a strong relationship between monetary policy shocks
and exchange rate dynamics. The effect of monetary policy on exchange rate volatility, however,
has received relatively little attention in the literature. In this paper, we have developed a VAR
model with stochastic volatility to analyze the nexus between monetary policy shocks in the US
and abroad on three currencies relative to the US dollar. The model allows for investigating what
determines exchange rate volatility and allows for dynamic feedback effects between the change in
the exchange rate and its volatility. Our findings indicate that exchange rates tend to appreciate
with respect to a domestic monetary tightening. The shape of the exchange rate responses has
generated a vivid discussion in the past with a large literature pointing towards a behavior of
delayed overshooting. For the country pairs considered, our novel empirical framework cannot
confirm this, suggesting instead the immediate exchange rates responses tend to undershoot their
level of long-run appreciation, consistent with other recent contributions (c.f. Mu¨ller et al., 2019;
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2018). We moreover find that exchange rate volatility tends to increase
with respect to monetary policy shocks. Finally, our analysis indicates that while monetary policy
shocks explain a small fraction of the forecast error variance of the exchange rate and its volatility,
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the quantitative contribution in terms of historical decompositions are large, especially during the
first half of the sample.
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Appendix A Data
Below we report in detail all data sources and transformations applied.
• Data US (all series obtained from the FRED database):
– Real GDP per capita (A939RX0Q048SBEA)
– Consumer prices index (CPIAUCSL)
– Federal funds rate (FEDFUNDS)
– Shares of gross domestic product: Imports of goods and services (B021RE1Q156NBEA)
– US inflation obtained by 400*diff(log(CPIAUCSL)))
– US GDP per capita growth obtained by 100*diff(log(GDP/Capita))
• Population growth rates (World Bank: World Development Indicators) on a yearly basis (in-
terpolated with cubic spline to quarterly data) for UK and JP
• Data UK/JP (all series obtained from OECD except exchange rates (IMF) ):
– Real GDP growth (total, percentage change, previous period)
– Consumer price index (2015 base year)
– Short-term interest rate
– Trade in goods and services Imports, % of GDP
– Bilateral exchange rates (U.S.) obtained from IMF
– Inflation obtained by 400*diff(log(CPI)))
– Exchange rate returns with 100*(diff(log(EXR))
– Real GDP per capita growth rate is obtained by subtracting the population growth rate
from real GDP growth, adjust scale (x100)
• Euro Area (all series obtained from AWM except Euro Area population growth and exchange
rate)
– YER (GDP), HICPSYA (CPI seasonal adjusted), STN (STIR), XTR (EX), MTR (IM)
– Import share is defined as IMP = MTR/(YER-XTR+MTR)*100)
– Inflation is obtained by 400*diff(log(HICP))
– Real GDP per capita growth rate is obtained by subtracting the population growth rate
from real GDP growth (diff(log(GDP))), adjust scale (x100)
– Population growth for EA obtained from ECB data warehouse on a yearly basis, also
interpolated with cubic spline to quarterly data
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– Bilateral exchange rate (U.S) obtained from IMF for BE, DE, ES, FR, IE, IT, LU, NL, AT,
PT, FI, GR up to 1999 and Euro/USD afterwards
∗ Apply same method as Lubik and Schorfheide (2005) by using the weights from their
paper to construct EA exchange rate before 1999: BE=0.036; DE=0.283; ES=0.111;
FR=0.201; IE=0.015; IT=0.195; LU=0.003; NL=0.060; AT=0.030; PT=0.024;
FI=0.017; GR=0.025
∗ Adjust the level of the two exchange rate series (prior/post 1999) by match the level
of the year 1998 and 1999 (see also Lubik and Schorfheide (2005))
∗ For Euro/USD exchange rate for periods 1999-2016: two different options:
· EXR from AWM database
· Exchange rate from IMF database
∗ Exchange rate returns with 100*(diff(log(EXR))
Appendix B The two-country DSGE model
B.1 Summary of the DSGE model
Below we list the DSGE first order and equilibrium equations, as put into code, that is, prices are re-
expressed in terms of real terms (deflated), and allocations are in terms of stationarized variables,
denoted by lowercase variables. In particular, we define ct = CtZt , cH,t =
CH,t
Zt
, cF,t =
CF,t
Zt
, gct = GtZt ,
c∗t =
C∗t
Zt
, c∗H,t =
C∗H,t
Zt
, c∗F,t =
C∗F,t
Zt
, gc∗t =
G∗t
Zt
, wt = WtZtPt , w
∗
t =
W ∗t
ZtP ∗t
, yt = YtZt , pit =
Pt
Pt−1 , pi
∗
t =
P ∗t
P ∗t−1
,
piH,t =
PH,t
PH,t−1 , pi
∗
H,t =
P ∗H,t
P ∗H,t−1
, piF,t =
PF,t
PF,t−1 , pi
∗
F,t =
P ∗F,t
P ∗F,t−1
, rert =
εtP ∗t
Pt
, tott =
PF,t
εtP ∗H,t
, tot∗t =
εtP ∗H,t
PF,t
,
pH,t =
PH,t
Pt
, pF,t =
PF,t
Pt
, p∗H,t =
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
, p∗F,t =
P ∗F,t
P ∗t
, λt = ΛtZt, bHt = BHtZtPt , λ
∗
t = Λ
∗
tZ
∗
t , b
∗
Ht =
B∗Ht
ZtPt
,
Zt
Zt−1 = γz.
Households’ intratemporal optimality conditions: demand functions, CES-based prices, labor supply
Home
cH,t cH,t = γc (pH,t)
− ct
cF,t cF,t = (1− γc) (pF,t)− ct
ct pH,t =
[
γc + (1− γc)
(
tott
gapt
)1−]− 11−
tott pF,t =
[
γc
(
gap∗t
tott
)1−
+ (1− γc)
]− 1
1−
Foreign
c∗H,t c
∗
H,t = γ
∗
c
(
p∗H,t
)−∗
c∗t
c∗F,t c
∗
F,t = (1− γ∗c )
(
p∗F,t
)−∗
c∗t
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c∗t p∗F,t =
[
γ∗c
(
tot∗t
gap∗t
)1−∗
+ (1− γ∗c )
]− 1
1−∗
tot∗t p∗H,t =
[
γ∗c + (1− γ∗c )
(
1
tot∗t gap∗t
)1−∗]− 11−∗
Firms’ optimality conditions
Home
Lt yt = AtLt
mct mct =
wt
At
piH,t
[
θmctpHt − (θ − 1) τ
]
= αH (piHt − piH)piHt − βαH λt+1λt (piHt+1 − piH)piHt+1
yt+1
yt
piF,t
[
θ
rertp∗Ft
pFt
− (θ − 1) τ
]
= αF (piFt − piF )piFt − βαF λt+1λt (piFt+1 − piF )piFt+1
cF,t+1
cF,t
pH,t piH,t =
pH,t
pH,t−1pit
pF,t piF,t =
pF,t
pF,t−1pit
gapt gapt =
p∗F,trert
pF,t
Foreign
L∗t y∗t = A∗tL∗t
mc∗t mc∗t =
w∗t
A∗t
pi∗H,t
[
θ pHtrertp∗Ht
− (θ − 1) τ
]
= α∗H (pi
∗
Ht − pi∗H)pi∗Ht − βα∗H
λ∗t+1
λ∗t
(
pi∗Ht+1 − pi∗H
)
pi∗Ht+1
c∗H,t+1
c∗H,t
pi∗F,t
[
θ
mc∗t
p∗Ft
− (θ − 1) τ
]
= α∗F (pi
∗
Ft − pi∗F )pi∗Ft − βα∗F
λ∗t+1
λ∗t
(
pi∗Ft+1 − pi∗F
)
pi∗Ft+1
y∗t+1
y∗t
p∗F,t pi
∗
F,t =
p∗F,t
p∗F,t−1
pi∗t
p∗H,t pi
∗
H,t =
p∗H,t
p∗H,t−1
pi∗t
gap∗t gap∗t =
pH,t
p∗H,trert
Market clearing
yt yt =
[
cH,t + gct +
1−n
n c
∗
H,t
]
y∗t y∗t =
[
n
1−ncF,t + c
∗
F,t + gc
∗
t
]
Households’ optimality conditions
Home
λt λt =
(
ct − h ct−1γz
)−σc
(or: λt =
(
ct − h ct−1γz
)−σc − βh( 1γz)(ct+1 − h ctγz))
wt ψL
σl
t = λtwt
pit λt = βEt
{
λt+1
Rt
pit+1
1
γz
}
bHt
bHt
Rt
= bHt−1 1γz
1
pit
+ pHtyt − ct − pHtgct
Foreign
λ∗t λ∗t =
(
c∗t − h∗ c
∗
t−1
γz
)−σ∗c
(or: λ∗t =
(
c∗t − h∗ c
∗
t−1
γz
)−σ∗c − βh∗ ( 1γz)(c∗t+1 − h∗ c∗tγz))
w∗t ψ∗L
∗σ∗l
t = λ
∗
tw
∗
t
pi∗t λ∗t = βEt
{
λ∗t+1
R∗t
pi∗t+1
1
γz
}
rert λ
∗
t = βEt
{
λ∗t+1
Rt
pit+1
rert
rert+1
1
γz
}
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Monetary policy
Rt
Rt
R =
(
Rt−1
1+i
)ρR [(pit
pi
)ρpi (yt
y
)ρY
(∆εt)
ρ∆ε
]1−ρR
exp (R,t) , R,t ∼ N
(
0, σ2R
)
R∗t
R∗t
R∗ =
(
R∗t−1
R∗
)ρR [(pi∗t
pi∗
)ρpi (y∗t
y∗
)ρY ( 1
∆εt
)ρ∗∆ε]1−ρR
exp
(
∗R,t
)
, ∗R,t ∼ N
(
0, σ∗2R
)
Exogenous processes
At logAt = ρA logAt−1 + A,t, A,t ∼ N
(
0, σ2A
)
A∗t logA∗t = ρ∗A logA
∗
t−1 + ∗A,t, 
∗
A,t ∼ N
(
0, σ∗2A
)
gt log gt = ρg log gt−1 + (1− ρg) log g + g,t, g,t ∼ N
(
0, σ2g
)
g∗t log
∗
t = ρ
∗
g log g
∗
t−1 +
(
1− ρ∗g
)
log g∗ + ∗g,t, ∗g,t ∼ N
(
0, σ∗2g
)
Change in nominal exchange rate
∆nert ∆nert =
rert
rert−1
pit
pi∗t
exp (PPP,t) , PPP,t ∼ N
(
0, σ2PPP
)
Observables, given by equation 19 in the main text.
B.2 DSGE estimation results
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Table B.1: Estimated DSGE model parameters
US-EA US-UK US-JP
param. prior prior prior post. intervals post. intervals post. intervals
distr. mean std. mean 16% 84% mean 16% 84% mean 16% 84%
ξH beta 0.50 0.15 0.74 0.71 0.80 0.66 0.59 0.74 0.66 0.60 0.73
ξ∗F beta 0.70 0.15 0.83 0.80 0.86 0.85 0.83 0.87 0.88 0.86 0.89
ξF beta 0.50 0.15 0.46 0.25 0.65 0.86 0.81 0.92 0.79 0.71 0.88
ξ∗H beta 0.70 0.15 0.73 0.59 0.89 0.84 0.72 0.99 0.76 0.60 0.96
σ gamma 2.00 0.30 3.77 3.26 4.25 2.79 2.35 3.20 3.38 2.90 3.87
h beta 0.30 0.05 0.57 0.51 0.64 0.53 0.46 0.64 0.42 0.32 0.52
 gamma 1.00 0.50 0.17 0.05 0.24 0.16 0.10 0.21 0.08 0.05 0.10
ρpi gamma 1.60 0.10 1.35 1.23 1.47 1.25 1.15 1.34 1.33 1.23 1.44
ρ∗pi gamma 1.60 0.10 1.31 1.19 1.43 1.27 1.16 1.38 1.19 1.10 1.27
ρ∆Y gamma 0.25 0.05 0.34 0.25 0.42 0.42 0.33 0.52 0.39 0.30 0.48
ρ∗∆Y gamma 0.25 0.05 0.35 0.26 0.44 0.25 0.18 0.31 0.22 0.17 0.27
ρ∆ε gamma 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.04
ρ∗∆ε gamma 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.04 0.08
ρR beta 0.50 0.20 0.78 0.75 0.81 0.76 0.74 0.79 0.76 0.73 0.79
ρ∗R beta 0.50 0.20 0.86 0.84 0.88 0.91 0.90 0.92 0.88 0.86 0.89
ρA beta 0.70 0.20 0.80 0.75 0.86 0.80 0.73 0.87 0.82 0.76 0.88
ρ∗A beta 0.70 0.20 0.90 0.88 0.93 0.95 0.94 0.96 0.95 0.93 0.96
ρg beta 0.80 0.10 0.96 0.94 0.98 0.94 0.92 0.96 0.94 0.93 0.96
ρ∗g beta 0.80 0.10 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.97 0.95 0.99 0.99 0.98 1.00
σA inv.gam. 1.50 4.00 4.02 3.30 5.00 3.87 3.09 5.00 3.62 2.65 4.76
σ∗A inv.gam. 1.50 4.00 3.82 3.04 4.95 4.79 4.60 5.00 4.58 4.23 5.00
σg inv.gam. 1.00 4.00 0.86 0.79 0.92 0.86 0.79 0.93 0.89 0.82 0.95
σ∗g inv.gam. 1.00 4.00 0.74 0.68 0.80 0.89 0.82 0.96 1.09 1.01 1.17
σR inv.gam. 0.40 4.00 0.26 0.23 0.28 0.26 0.23 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.28
σ∗R inv.gam. 0.40 4.00 0.17 0.15 0.18 0.20 0.19 0.22 0.16 0.14 0.17
σppp inv.gam. 3.50 4.00 4.56 4.26 4.86 4.77 4.60 5.00 4.90 4.82 5.00
rss gamma 0.50 0.25 0.28 0.10 0.39 0.23 0.10 0.32 0.24 0.10 0.34
piss normal 7.00 2.00 4.19 3.64 4.76 6.28 5.12 7.33 5.29 4.40 6.09
γqz gamma 0.40 0.20 0.43 0.41 0.46 0.43 0.41 0.45 0.44 0.42 0.47
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Appendix C Empirical model
C.1 Full conditional posterior simulation
Unfortunately, the joint distribution of the latent quantities and coefficients in our model takes no
well known form. This calls for simulation-based techniques. To simulate from the joint posterior,
we resort to Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods to carry out posterior inference.
It is noteworthy that the model in Eq. (26) is a standard VAR model with the first equation
being the law of motion of exchange rate volatility. The presence of stochastic volatility and the
non-linear interaction between the change and the (log) volatility of the exchange rate implies that
our model is a non-linear and non-Gaussian state space model. Additional complications arise from
the fact that the shocks to zt are correlated, leading to a model closely related to a multivariate
stochastic volatility with leverage specification. These issues imply that estimating the full history
of ht is difficult and standard techniques based on Gibbs sampling in state space models (such as
the methods proposed in Kim et al., 1998) can not be used.
Fortunately, conditional on the full history of ωjt, the remaining parameters can be simulated by
using relatively standard Gibbs updating steps. The corresponding MCMC algorithm cycles between
the following blocks:
• We simulate from the posterior of B, conditional on the full history of ωjt (that includes
ht) and σ2h, by using the algorithm proposed in Carriero et al. (2019). This implies that we
perform equation-by-equation estimation, where each equation in zt is augmented with the
shocks of the preceding equations. After cycling through all equations of the system, this yields
a draw ofB, ξ and the free elements in U . For each equation j = 1, . . . ,m, the corresponding
conditional posterior is Gaussian and takes a standard form:
Bj−|• ∼ N (Bj−,Vj−). (A.1)
Here, the notationBj− selects the jth row of a matrixB, whileBj−,Vj− denote the posterior
mean and variance, respectively. The posterior moments are given by
V j− =
(
X˜ ′jX˜j + V
−1
j−
)−1
, (A.2)
Bj− = V j−
(
X˜ ′j z˜ + V
−1
j−bj
)
, (A.3)
whereby X˜j and z˜ denote T×Kj (forKj = K+j−1) and T×1 full-data matrices, respectively.
Both matrices are rescaled by dividing each row of X˜j and z˜ by eωjt/2 to render the model
conditionally homoscedastic. The matrix X˜j differs across equations because it consists of
of D = (d1, . . . ,dT )′ and the reduced-form shocks of the preceding j − 1 equations, X˜j =
(D,w1, . . . ,wj−1), with wi denoting the stacked shocks associated with equation i. Finally,
we let V −1j− = diag(τj−, 10, . . . , 10), with τ−j denoting the jth column of a K ×m matrix that
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stores the prior scaling parameters τi and bj = (B
′
0−,j , 0, . . . , 0)
′ consisting of the jth column
of B0 and additional zeroes that capture the prior mean on the corresponding elements in ξ.
For j = 1, the corresponding posterior moments simplify further since X˜j = D˜.
• Conditional on all parameters of the model, we obtain the full history of the log-volatilities
of ht by relying on a single-step Metropolis Hastings (MH) algorithm and propose h∗t from a
Gaussian distribution that takes a well-known form (for more information, see, Carlin et al.,
1992; Jacquier et al., 2002). Conditional on this proposed value of h∗t , we compute the MH
acceptance probability by evaluating the likelihood of the VAR model. One key advantage of
our model is that ht never shows up directly in the mean equation but only indirectly because
of ξ. This yields the convenient property that the only equation that depends directly on ht is
the exchange rate equation, since w˜mt, the mth element of w˜t, is uncorrelated with w˜jt (for
j = m) yielding:
p(w˜mt|•, ht) = e−ht/2 × exp
(
− w˜
2
mt
eht
)
(A.4)
Hence, conditional on time t and Q, the remainingm− 1 elements in w˜t do not depend on ht
but only on its lags. This simplifies the likelihood of the model enormously, implying that the
time t acceptance probability reduces to
pMH(h
∗
t , ht) = min
(
p(w˜mt|•, h∗t )
p(w˜mt|•, ht) , 1
)
. (A.5)
• The full history of the log-volatilities and the corresponding parameters of the state equation
are simulated by means of the algorithm proposed in Kastner and Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter (2014).
This is achieved by using the R package stochvol (Kastner, 2016).
• σ2h is obtained, conditional on β and {ht}t=1,...,T , from an inverted Gamma distributed pos-
terior distribution that takes a standard form:
σ2h|• ∼ G−1
(
0.01 +
T
2
, 0.01 +
∑T
t=1 v
2
t
2
)
. (A.6)
• The indicators that determine whether the coefficients are pushed towards the prior restric-
tions (i.e. the DSGE model in the case of all quantities except ht) can be obtained by simulat-
ing, one at a time, from a Bernoulli distributed posterior distribution with posterior probability
taking a particularly simple form:
δj |• ∼ Bernoulli(pj) (A.7)
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with
pj =
1√
s0j
exp
(
− (bj−b0j)22s0j
)
p
(n)
j
1√
s0j
exp
(
− (bj−b0j)22s0j
)
p
(n)
j +
1√
s1j
exp
(
− (bj−b0j)22s1j
)
(1− p(n)j )
. (A.8)
• The inverse scaling parameters s−11j are obtained from a Gamma distribution,
s−11j |• ∼ G
(
d0 + 1/2, d1 +
(bj − b0j)2
2{djζ + (1− dj)}
)
. (A.9)
• Finally, the equation-specific prior inclusion probability can be simulated from a Beta distri-
bution:
p(n)|• ∼ B
(
1 +
K∑
i=1
δ−,n, 1 +K −
K∑
i=1
δ−,n
)
, (A.10)
where δ−,n denotes the nth column of a K ×m-dimensional matrix that stores the indicators
δj for each equation in its columns.
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